

# Case study I: Advertising on the Web

**Genoveva Vargas-Solar**


<http://www.vargas-solar.com/big-data-analytics>

French Council of Scientific Research, LIG & LAFMIA Labs

Montevideo, 22<sup>nd</sup> November – 4<sup>th</sup> December, 2015



# Infinite data / App



# Online Algorithms

- **Classic model of algorithms**


- You get to see the entire input, then compute some function of it
- In this context, “offline algorithm”

- **Online Algorithms**

- You get to see the input one piece at a time, and need to make irrevocable decisions along the way
- **Similar to the data stream model**


# Online Bipartite Matching

# Example: Bipartite Matching




**Nodes: Boys and Girls; Edges: Preferences**  
**Goal: Match boys to girls so that maximum number of preferences is satisfied**

# Example: Bipartite Matching



$M = \{(1,a), (2,b), (3,d)\}$  is a **matching**  
**Cardinality of matching =  $|M| = 3$**

# Example: Bipartite Matching



$M = \{(1,c), (2,b), (3,d), (4,a)\}$  is a  
**perfect matching**

**Perfect matching** ... all vertices of the graph are matched

**Maximum matching** ... a matching that contains the largest possible number of matches

# Matching Algorithm


- **Problem:** Find a maximum matching for a given bipartite graph
  - A perfect one if it exists
- There is a polynomial-time offline algorithm based on augmenting paths (Hopcroft & Karp 1973, see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hopcroft-Karp\\_algorithm](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hopcroft-Karp_algorithm))
- **But what if we do not know the entire graph upfront?**



# Online Graph Matching Problem

- Initially, we are given the set **boys**
- In each round, **one girl's choices are revealed**
  - That is, girl's **edges** are revealed
- **At that time, we have to decide to either:**
  - Pair the **girl** with a **boy**
  - Do not pair the **girl** with any **boy**
- **Example of application:** Assigning tasks to servers

# Online Graph Matching: Example



# Greedy Algorithm

- **Greedy algorithm for the online graph matching problem:**
  - Pair the new girl with **any** eligible boy
    - If there is none, do not pair girl
  
- **How good is the algorithm?**

# Competitive Ratio


- For input  $I$ , suppose greedy produces matching  $M_{greedy}$  while an optimal matching is  $M_{opt}$

**Competitive ratio** =  $\min_{\text{all possible inputs } I} (|M_{greedy}| / |M_{opt}|)$

(what is greedy's worst performance over all possible inputs  $I$ )

# Analyzing the Greedy Algorithm

- Consider a case:  $M_{greedy} \neq M_{opt}$
- Consider the set  $G$  of girls matched in  $M_{opt}$  but not in  $M_{greedy}$
- Then every boy  $B$  adjacent to girls in  $G$  is already matched in  $M_{greedy}$ :
  - If there would exist such non-matched (by  $M_{greedy}$ ) boy adjacent to a non-matched girl then greedy would have matched them
- Since boys  $B$  are already matched in  $M_{greedy}$  then  
**(1)**  $|M_{greedy}| \geq |B|$



# Web advertisement

# History of Web Advertising

15

- **Banner ads (1995-2001)**
  - Initial form of web advertising
  - Popular websites charged X\$ for every 1,000 “impressions” of the ad
    - Called “**CPM**” rate (Cost per thousand impressions)
    - Modeled similar to TV, magazine ads
  - From **untargeted** to **demographically targeted**
  - **Low click-through rates**
    - Low ROI for advertisers



**CPM...cost per mille**  
**Mille...thousand in Latin**

# Performance-based Advertising

16

- **Introduced by Overture around 2000**
  - Advertisers **bid** on **search keywords**
  - When someone searches for that keyword, the **highest bidder's ad is shown**
  - Advertiser is charged only if the ad is clicked on
- Similar model adapted by Google with some changes around 2002
  - Called **Adwords**



# Ads vs. Search Results

**Web** Results 1 - 10 of about 2,230,000 for geico. (0.04 sec)

**GEICO** Car Insurance. Get an auto insurance quote and save today ...  
 GEICO auto insurance, online car insurance quote, motorcycle insurance quote, online insurance sales and service from a leading insurance company.  
[www.geico.com/](http://www.geico.com/) - 21k - Sep 22, 2005 - Cached - Similar pages  
[Auto Insurance](#) - [Buy Auto Insurance](#)  
[Contact Us](#) - [Make a Payment](#)  
[More results from www.geico.com »](#)

**Geico**, Google Settle Trademark Dispute  
 The case was resolved out of court, so advertisers are still left without legal guidance on use of trademarks within ads or as keywords.  
[www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3547356](http://www.clickz.com/news/article.php/3547356) - 44k - Cached - Similar pages

Google and **GEICO** settle AdWords dispute | The Register  
 Google and car insurance firm **GEICO** have settled a trade mark dispute over ... Car insurance firm **GEICO** sued both Google and Yahoo! subsidiary Overture in ...  
[www.theregister.co.uk/2005/09/09/google\\_geico\\_settlement/](http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/09/09/google_geico_settlement/) - 21k - Cached - Similar pages

**GEICO** v. Google  
 ... involving a lawsuit filed by Government Employees Insurance Company (**GEICO**). **GEICO** has filed suit against two major Internet search engine operators, ...  
[www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/geico\\_google.html](http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/geico_google.html) - 19k - Cached - Similar pages

Sponsored Links

**Great Car Insurance Rates**  
 Simplify Buying Insurance at Safeco  
 See Your Rate with an Instant Quote  
[www.Safeco.com](http://www.Safeco.com)

**Free Insurance Quotes**  
 Fill out one simple form to get multiple quotes from local agents.  
[www.HometownQuotes.com](http://www.HometownQuotes.com)

**5 Free Quotes. 1 Form.**  
 Get 5 Free Quotes In Minutes!  
 You Have Nothing To Lose. It's Free  
[sayyessoftware.com/Insurance](http://sayyessoftware.com/Insurance)  
 Missouri

# Web 2.0

- **Performance-based advertising works!**
  - Multi-billion-dollar industry
- **Interesting problem:**  
What ads to show for a given query?
- **If I am an advertiser, which search terms should I bid on and how much should I bid?**

# Adwords Problem

- **Given:**
  - 1. A set of bids by advertisers for search queries
  - 2. A click-through rate for each advertiser-query pair
  - 3. A budget for each advertiser (say for 1 month)
  - 4. A limit on the number of ads to be displayed with each search query
- **Respond to each search query with a set of advertisers such that:**
  - 1. The size of the set is no larger than the limit on the number of ads per query
  - 2. Each advertiser has bid on the search query
  - 3. Each advertiser has enough budget left to pay for the ad if it is clicked upon

# Adwords Problem

- A stream of queries arrives at the search engine:  $q_1, q_2, \dots$
- Several advertisers bid on each query
- When query  $q_i$  arrives, search engine must pick a subset of advertisers whose ads are shown
- **Goal:** Maximize search engine's revenues
  - **Simple solution:** Instead of raw bids, use the “expected revenue per click” (i.e.,  $\text{Bid} \times \text{CTR}$  – Click Through Rate)
- **Clearly we need an online algorithm!**

# The Adwords Innovation

Advertiser	Bid	CTR	Bid * CTR
A	\$1.00	1%	1 cent
B	\$0.75	2%	1.5 cents
C	\$0.50	2.5%	1.125 cents

Click through  
rate

Expected  
revenue

# The Adwords Innovation

Advertiser	Bid	CTR	Bid * CTR
B	\$0.75	2%	1.5 cents
C	\$0.50	2.5%	1.125 cents
A	\$1.00	1%	1 cent

# Complications: Budget

- **Two complications:**
  - **Budget**
  - **CTR of an ad is unknown**
- **Each advertiser has a limited budget**
  - Search engine guarantees that the advertiser will not be charged more than their daily budget

# Complications: CTR

- **CTR: Each ad has a different likelihood of being clicked**
  - Advertiser 1 bids \$2, click probability = 0.1
  - Advertiser 2 bids \$1, click probability = 0.5
  - **Clickthrough rate (CTR)** is measured **historically**
    - **Very hard problem: Exploration vs. exploitation**
      - Exploit:** Should we keep showing an ad for which we have good estimates of click-through rate
      - or
      - Explore:** Shall we show a brand new ad to get a better sense of its click-through rate





# Greedy Algorithm

- **Our setting: Simplified environment**
  - There is **1** ad shown for each query
  - All advertisers have the same budget ***B***
  - All ads are equally likely to be clicked
  - Value of each ad is the same (=1)
- **Simplest algorithm is greedy:**
  - For a query pick any advertiser who has bid **1** for that query
  - **Competitive ratio of greedy is 1/2**

# Bad Scenario for Greedy

- **Two advertisers A and B**
  - A bids on query  $x$ , B bids on  $x$  and  $y$
  - Both have budgets of \$4
- **Query stream:  $x x x x y y y y$** 
  - Worst case greedy choice: **B B B B** \_ \_ \_ \_
  - Optimal: **A A A A B B B B**
  - **Competitive ratio =  $\frac{1}{2}$**
- **This is the worst case!**
  - **Note:** Greedy algorithm is deterministic – it always resolves draws in the same way

# BALANCE Algorithm [MSVV]

- **BALANCE** Algorithm by Mehta, Saberi, Vazirani, and Vazirani
  - For each query, pick the advertiser with the largest unspent budget
    - Break ties arbitrarily (but in a deterministic way)


# Example: BALANCE

- **Two advertisers A and B**
  - A bids on query  $x$ , B bids on  $x$  and  $y$
  - Both have budgets of \$4
- **Query stream:**  $x x x x y y y y$
- **BALANCE choice:** A B A B B B \_ \_
  - Optimal: A A A A B B B B
- **In general:** For BALANCE on 2 advertisers **Competitive ratio** =  $\frac{3}{4}$

# Analyzing BALANCE

- **Consider simple case (w.l.o.g.):**
  - 2 advertisers,  $A_1$  and  $A_2$ , each with budget  $B$  ( $\geq 1$ )
  - Optimal solution exhausts both advertisers' budgets
- **BALANCE must exhaust at least one advertiser's budget:**
  - **If not, we can allocate more queries**
    - Whenever BALANCE makes a mistake (both advertisers bid on the query), advertiser's unspent budget only decreases
    - Since optimal exhausts both budgets, one will for sure get exhausted
  - Assume BALANCE exhausts  $A_2$ 's budget, but allocates  $x$  queries fewer than the optimal
  - **Revenue:  $BAL = 2B - x$**

# Analyzing Balance



# BALANCE: General Result


- **In the general case, worst competitive ratio of BALANCE is  $1 - 1/e = \text{approx. } 0.63$** 
  - Interestingly, no online algorithm has a better competitive ratio!
- **Let's see the worst case example that gives this ratio**



# Worst case for BALANCE

- **$N$  advertisers:**  $A_1, A_2, \dots, A_N$ 
  - Each with budget  $B > N$
- **Queries:**
  - $N \cdot B$  queries appear in  $N$  rounds of  $B$  queries each
- **Bidding:**
  - Round 1 queries: bidders  $A_1, A_2, \dots, A_N$
  - Round 2 queries: bidders  $A_2, A_3, \dots, A_N$
  - Round  $i$  queries: bidders  $A_i, \dots, A_N$
- **Optimum allocation:**  
Allocate round  $i$  queries to  $A_i$ 
  - Optimum revenue  $N \cdot B$

# BALANCE Allocation




BALANCE assigns each of the queries in round 1 to  $N$  advertisers. After  $k$  rounds, sum of allocations to each of advertisers  $A_k, \dots, A_N$

$$\text{is } S_k = S_{k+1} = \dots = S_N = \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} \frac{B}{N-(i-1)}$$

**If we find the smallest  $k$  such that  $S_k \geq B$ , then after  $k$  rounds**

**we cannot allocate any queries to any advertiser**

# BALANCE: Analysis





# BALANCE: Analysis

- So after the first  $k=N(1-1/e)$  rounds, we cannot allocate a query to any advertiser
- **Revenue =  $B \cdot N (1-1/e)$**
- **Competitive ratio =  $1-1/e$**

# General Version of the Problem

- **Arbitrary bids and arbitrary budgets!**
- Consider we have 1 query  $q$ , advertiser  $i$ 
  - Bid =  $x_i$
  - Budget =  $b_i$
- **In a general setting BALANCE can be terrible**
  - Consider two advertisers  $A_1$  and  $A_2$
  - $A_1: x_1 = 1, b_1 = 110$
  - $A_2: x_2 = 10, b_2 = 100$
  - Consider we see **10** instances of  $q$
  - BALANCE always selects  $A_1$  and earns **10**
  - Optimal earns **100**

# Generalized BALANCE

- **Arbitrary bids:** consider query  $q$ , bidder  $i$ 
  - Bid =  $x_i$
  - Budget =  $b_i$
  - Amount spent so far =  $m_i$
  - Fraction of budget left over  $f_i = 1 - m_i/b_i$
  - Define  $\psi_i(q) = x_i(1 - e^{-f_i})$
- Allocate query  $q$  to bidder  $i$  with largest value of  $\psi_i(q)$
- **Same competitive ratio (1-1/e)**